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Abstract
We determine the semantic security capacity for quantum wiretap
channels. We extend methods for classical channels to quantum chan-
nels to demonstrate that a strongly secure code guarantees a semantically
secure code with the same secrecy rate. Furthermore, we show how to
1
transform a non-secure code into a semantically secure code by means
of biregular irreducible functions (BRI functions). We analyze semantic
security for classical quantum channels and for quantum channels.
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1 Introduction
We investigate the transmission of messages from a sending to a receiving party
through a wiretap channel. In this model, there is a third party called an eaves-
dropper who must not be allowed to know the information sent from the sender
to the intended receiver. The wiretap channel was first introduced by Wyner
in [52]. A classical-quantum channel with an eavesdropper is called a classical-
quantum wiretap channel.
The secrecy capacity of the classical-quantum wiretap channel subject to
the strong security criterion has been determined in [26, 23]. Strong security
means that given a uniformly distributed message sent through the channel,
the eavesdropper shall obtain no information about it. This criterion goes back
to [24, 36] and it is the most common secrecy criterion in classical and quantum
information theory.
In the present paper, however, a stronger security requirement will be ap-
plied, called semantic security (and defined in Section 3). With this, the eaves-
dropper gains no information regardless of the message distribution. This cri-
terion was introduced to information theory from cryptography [11], motivated
by the analogous security criterion of the same name. It is equivalent to mes-
sage indistinguishability, where the eavesdropper cannot distinguish whether
the given cipher text is an encryption of any two messages (which can even
be chosen by the eavesdropper). Aside from being the minimum security re-
quirement in practical applications, semantic security is also necessary in the
security of identification codes [4]. Because in identification pairs of messages
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Figure 1: A general common-randomness coding scheme. W denotes the
classical-quantum channel between sender and receiver, while V is the wiretap.
{{Em, Dm : m ∈ M} : s ∈ S} is a common-randomness code for W .
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Figure 2: The modular BRI scheme. C = {E′m, D′m : m ∈ M} is a code forW and
f is a biregular irreducible function. In practice, C will be a transmisison code,
namely a code with low error. f−1s denotes the random choice of an element of
f−1s (m) for the given message m and seed s. The seed s has to be known to the
sender and receiver beforehand or it is generated by the sender and transmitted
to the intended receiver through the channel.
are compared to each other, to make the code secure, any two messages must be
indistinguishable at the eavesdropper [5]. Message indistinguishability is thus
necessary to construct secure identification codes, and the semantic security
achieved in this paper can thus be used to construct secure identification codes
via classical-quantum channels [20].
In Section 4, we show that we can convert a code for the classical-quantum
channel which has a small leakage with respect to the strong security criterion
into a code which has a small leakage with respect to the semantic security leak-
age. This can be done by restricting the message set to a suitable large subset
(which in general depends on the channel), just like for classical wiretap chan-
nels [48]. For the case where security is measured in terms of the trace norm
instead of the Holevo quantity, the analogous statement was shown before for
classical-quantum channels in [40]. However, these proofs are merely existence
statements and give no clue as to how to find the large message subset which pro-
vides semantic security. We extend the results for the classical-quantum channel
in Section 3.4 to quantum channels with the environment entangled with the
quantum system, which is completely under the control of a constant eavesdrop-
per.
In Section 5, we show how this capacity can be achieved by modularly cor-
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recting transmission error and amplifying privacy in separate components of
the code, as for the case of strong secrecy [29]. These modular codes for the
classical-quantum wiretap channel are constructed concatenating an ordinary
transmission code for the channel from the sender to the intended receiver with
an additional security component. Furthermore, the additional security compo-
nent is independent of the channel, as for the case of explicit strong secrecy
constructions. The first such security components used in the literature were
universal hash functions [12, 29], used to achieve strong secrecy. The specific se-
curity components we use, called biregular irreducible functions (BRI functions),
were introduced in [48] in the context of classical wiretap channels. A modular
code for the classical-quantum wiretap channel is illustrated in Figure 2.
If a transmission code from the sender to the intended receiver with in-
put/output set C is given, then a BRI function that is to be used with this
transmission code has the form f : S × C → N . Here, S is a seed set, and the
set M of messages of the modular wiretap code is an explicitly given subset
of N . To use this modular code, the sender and the intended receiver have to
share a seed s ∈ S, chosen uniformly at random from S. Given any message
m ∈ M and seed s, the sender randomly chooses a preimage c ∈ C, satisfy-
ing fs(c) = m. Since the intended receiver knows s, he can recover m if no
transmission error occurs. Thus the task of establishing reliable transmission is
entirely due to the transmission code, while the BRI function’s responsibility is
to ensure semantic security. The above modular construction was already shown
to achieve the secrecy capacity of classical wiretap channels with semantic se-
curity in [48]. An alternative to BRI functions was proposed by Hayashi and
Matsumoto [31]. Their example, however, requires a seed which is longer than
that which is necessary for the best-known BRI function.
We emphasize that the seed is not a secret key, since we do not require it
to be unknown to the eavesdropper. The main part of the analysis of the above
modular codes assumes that the seed is given (non-securely) to the sender and
the intended receiver by common randomness. However, it is a general result for
codes with common randomness that if the error probability and security leakage
decrease sufficiently fast in block length, the seed can be reused a small number
of times. Modular codes constructed using BRI functions show this behavior.
Therefore, no more than a negligible amount of rate is lost if the sender generates
the seed and transmits it to the intended receiver, and then reuses the seed a
small number of times. In particular, any rate which is achievable with a seed
given by common randomness is also achievable with a sender-generated seed.
Moreover we would like to emphasize that the semantic secrecy for classical-
quantum channels is much harder than for classical channels. Roughly speaking,
two different inputs not only result in two different random variables, but the
outputs have also different eigenspace, so it is more difficult to make them indis-
tinguishable. For instance, Corollary 5.10 delivers a bound which is technically
weaker than the classical version of [48] (see below).
2 Basic Notations and Definitions
The content of this section can be found in most books covering the basics of
matrix analysis and quantum information, see, for example, [13, 37, 49]. For a
finite set X , we denote the set of probability distributions on X by P (X ) and
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with E the expectation value. For a finite-dimensional complex Hilbert space
H , we denote the set of linear operators on H with L(H). Let ρ, σ ∈ L(H) be
Hermitian operators in L(H). We say ρ ≥ σ, or equivalently σ ≤ ρ, if ρ − σ is
positive-semidefinite. The (convex) space of density operators on H is defined
as
S(H) := {ρ ∈ L(H) : ρ ≥ 0H , tr(ρ) = 1},
where 0H is the null matrix onH . Note that any operator in S(H) is bounded. A
POVM (positive-operator valued measure) over a finite set M is a collection of
positive-semidefinite operators {Dm : m ∈M} on H , which is a partition of the
identity, i.e.
∑
m∈MDm = idH . The POVM describes a measurement that maps
quantum states ρ to classical values m ∈ M by assigning them the probability
tr[ρDm]. If
∑
m∈MDm ≤ idH then we call {Dm : m ∈M} a sub-POVM. More
generally, a measurement operator will be any positive semi-definite operator D
satisfying 0 ≤ D ≤ idH .
For a quantum state ρ ∈ S(H), we denote its von Neumann entropy by
S(ρ) := − tr(ρ log ρ),
and for a discrete random variable X , on a finite set X we denote the Shannon
entropy of X by
H(X) := −
∑
x∈X
p(x) log p(x),
where we use in both definitions and throughout this paper the convention that
the logarithm “ log” is taken in base 2. We denote with h(ν) := −ν log ν − (1 −
ν) log(1− ν) for ν ∈ [0, 1], the binary entropy.
Let ρ and σ be two positive semi-definite operators not necessarily in S(H).
The quantum relative entropy between ρ and σ is defined as
D(ρ ‖ σ) := tr ρ (log ρ− log σ)
if supp(ρ) ⊂ supp(σ), and D(ρ ‖ σ) :=∞ otherwise. For α ∈ (0, 1)∪ (1,∞), the
Rényi relative entropy between ρ and σ is defined as
Dα(ρ ‖ σ) := 1
α− 1 log tr
(
ρασ1−α
)
if supp(ρ) ⊂ supp(σ), and Dα(ρ‖σ) :=∞ otherwise. The Rényi relative entropy
satisfies the ordering relation
Dα(ρ ‖ σ) ≤ Dα′(ρ ‖ σ)
for any density operators ρ and σ, and any α ≤ α′ (cf. [7]). Furthermore, it
holds (cf. [7]), that
lim
αր1
Dα(ρ ‖ σ) = lim
αց1
Dα(ρ ‖ σ) = D(ρ ‖ σ) .
The Rényi relative entropies also satisfy monotonicity under quantum channels
(cf. [49]), namely under completely positive trace preserving linear maps Λ
Dα(Λ(ρ) ‖ Λ(σ)) ≤ Dα(ρ ‖ σ).
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For finite-dimensional complex Hilbert spaces H and H ′, a quantum chan-
nel N(ρ) is represented by a completely-positive trace-preserving linear map
N : L(H) → L(H ′), which accepts input quantum states in S(H) and pro-
duces output quantum states in S(H ′). Quantum channels will be treated in
Section 3.4, building on the results for classical-quantum channels. The case
of classical-quantum channels will be treated in Sections 3 to 5. For a finite-
dimensional complex Hilbert space H , a classical-quantum channel is a map
V : X → S(H), x 7→ V (x). In order to use the same notation common in classi-
cal information theory, for a measurement operator 0 ≤ D ≤ idH , we define the
following notation
ρ(D) := tr(ρ ·D) V (D|x) := tr(D · V (x));
notice that this notation, at least for the quantum state, is also common in
the C∗ algebra literature, where quantum states are considered functionals on
hermitian operators.
For a probability distribution P and a classical-quantum channel V on X ,
the Holevo χ quantity, or Holevo information, is defined as
χ(P ;V ) := S
(∑
x∈X
P (x)V (x)
)
−
∑
x∈X
P (x)S (V (x)) .
The Holevo information is also the mutual information between the input and
the output. Namely, let HX be a |X |-dimensional Hilbert space with a set of
orthonormal basis {|x〉 : x ∈ X}, and X be the random variable on X with
distribution P , then the Holevo information is the quantum mutual information
I(X ∧ V (X)) for the state
ρX,V :=
∑
x∈X
P (x) |x〉〈x| ⊗ V (x).
The Holevo quantity can also be written as the expected value of the quantum
relative entropy as a random variable of the states from the product states of
their marginals, namely if we denote the marginal with
ρX :=
∑
x∈X
P (x) |x〉〈x| PV :=
∑
x∈X
P (x)V (x)
= EX |X〉〈X | = EXV (X)
it is easy to check that the following holds
χ(P ;V ) = S(PV )−
∑
x∈X
P (x)S (V (x))
= D(ρX,V ‖ ρX ⊗ PV ) (1)
=
∑
x∈X
P (x)D(V (x) ‖ PV )
= EXD(V (X) ‖ EXV (X)). (2)
We then denote the conditional information of the quantum part conditioned
on the classical one as
S(V |P ) := S(PV )− χ(P ;V ) =
∑
x∈X
P (x)S (V (x)) .
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3 Strong and Semantic security
In this section we introduce the channels, the codes, and the capacities which
we will study, as well as the definitions for strong secrecy and semantic security
with and without common randomness. In Section 5 we will show how to ex-
plicitly build such codes using modular coding schemes which require common
randomness. For now, let us define the channels of interest.
Definition 3.1. Let X be a finite set and H and H ′ be finite-dimensional com-
plex Hilbert spaces. LetW : X → S(H) and V : X → S(H ′) be classical-quantum
channels. We call the pair (W,V ) a classical-quantum wiretap channel.
The intended receiver accesses the output of the first channel W , and the
eavesdropper observes the output of the second channel V in the pair.
3.1 Codes
A code is created by the sender and the intended receiver beforehand. The
sender uses the encoder to map the message that he wants to send to a channel
input, while the intended receiver uses the family of decoder operators on the
channel output to perform a measurement and decode the message. In all the
definitions below let us fix n ∈ N, finite sets M and X , finite quantum systems
H and H ′, and a classical-quantum wiretap channel (W,V ) from X to H and
H ′. Just like for the notation PV for a channel V : X → S(H) and a probability
distribution P over X , we define EV for a classical channel E : M → P(X ),
m 7→ Em ≡ E(·|m) as
EV : M→ S(H),
m 7→
∑
x∈X
V (x)E(x|m).
Notice that now, for a measurement operator D, we have two ways of writing
the output probability given m, namely EmV (D) and EV (D|m).
Definition 3.2 (Code, error, leakage).
An (n, |M|) code for (W,V ) is a finite set
C = {Em, Dm : m ∈ M},
where the stochastic encoder E :M→ P(Xn) is a classical channel, and the de-
coder operators {Dm : m ∈M} form a sub-POVM on H⊗n. We assume that the
POVM is completed by associating the measurement operator idH −
∑
m∈MDm
to the the error/abortion symbol of the decoder.
The (maximum) error (probability) of C is defined as
e(C, n) := sup
m∈M
EmW
⊗n(Dcm)
= sup
m∈M
∑
xn∈Xn
E(xn|m)(1−W⊗n(Dm|xn)),
where Dcm := idH⊗n −Dm. For any random variable M over the messages M,
the leakage of C with respect to M is defined as
χ
(
M ;EV ⊗n
)
.
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Observe that we consider codes with stochastic encoders as opposed to de-
terministic codes. In a deterministic code the encoder is deterministic, namely
in Definition 3.2 instead of a family of probability distributions {Em}m∈M, the
encoder consists of a family of n-length strings of symbols {cm}m∈M ⊆ Xn.The
deterministic encoder can be obtained as a special case of the stochastic encoder
by imposing that every probability distribution Em is deterministic. For mes-
sage transmission over an ordinary classical-quantum channel, and even for the
most general case of robust message transmission over an arbitrarily-varying
classical-quantum channel, it is enough to use deterministic encoders [2, 21].
However, for secret message transmission over wiretap channels, we need to use
stochastic encoders [23, 26].
Now we will define the coding scheme where both the sender and the receiver
have access to common randomness. We do not require this common randomness
to be secure against eavesdropping. Effectively, the common randomness simply
decides which among a set of classical-quantum codes from Definition 3.2,will
be used.
Definition 3.3 (Common-randomness code, error and leakage).
An (n, |S|, |M|) common-randomness code for (W,V ) is a finite subset
{Cs = {(Esm, Dsm) : m ∈M} : s ∈ S}
of the set of (n, |M|) codes from Definition 3.2, labeled by a finite set S.
Let S, the seed, be a uniform random variable over S. The (expected) error
of {Cs : s ∈ S} is defined as
ESe(CS , n) = 1|S|
∑
s∈S
e(Cs, n).
For any random variable M over the messages independent of S, the leakage
of {Cs} with respect to M is defined as
χ
(
M ;S,ESV ⊗n
)
. (3)
The definition of leakage reflects the possibility that the common randomness
is known perfectly to the eavesdropper, as the leakage is also computed against
the common randomness. Observe, that due to the independence of S andM , the
leakage can be written as conditional mutual (or Holevo) information between
the message M and the output conditioned on the seed S:
χ(M ;S,ESV ⊗n) = ESχ(M ;E
SV ⊗n) =
1
|S|
∑
s∈S
χ(M ;EsV ⊗n). (4)
The random seed should not be confused with the randomness of the stochas-
tic encoder. In the stochastic encoder, only the sender, but not the receiver, ran-
domly chooses a code word to encode a message m according to the probability
distribution Em. In the subsequent definitions of achievable rates, the receiver
should be able to decode m even when he only knows Em, but not which code
word is actually chosen by the sender. In contrast, a randomly chosen seed s
determines a stochastic encoder Es for the sender and a set of decoder operators
{Dsm : m ∈ M} for the receiver. Correctness is required only for the case that
s is known to both the sender and the receiver and that they use the encoder
and decoder prescribed by s.
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3.2 Capacities
Next we define the strong and semantic secrecy rates which can be achieved by
the codes introduced in the previous subsection. A good code reliably conveys
private information to the intended receiver such that the wiretapper’s knowl-
edge of the transmitted information can be kept arbitrarily small in terms of
the corresponding secrecy criterion.
Definition 3.4 (Strong secrecy).
A code C = {(Em, Dm) : m ∈M} is an (n,R, ǫ) strong secrecy code for
(W,V ) if
log |M| ≥ nR (5)
e(C, n) < ǫ , (6)
χ
(
U ;EV ⊗n
)
< ǫ, (7)
where U is the uniform distribution on M.
R is an achievable strong secrecy rate if for every ǫ > 0 and sufficiently
large n, there exists an (n,R − ǫ, ǫ) strong secrecy code. The strong secrecy
capacity Cstrong(W,V ) is the supremum of all achievable strong secrecy rates
of (W,V ).
Definition 3.5 (Common-randomness strong secrecy).
A common-randomness code {Cs = {(Esm, Dsm) : m ∈M} : s ∈ S} is an (n,R, ǫ)
common-randomness strong secrecy code for (W,V ) if
log |M| ≥ nR, (8)
ESe(CS, n) < ǫ, (9)
ESχ
(
U ;S,ESV ⊗n
)
< ǫ, (10)
where U is the uniform distribution on M.
R is an achievable common-randomness strong secrecy rate if for ev-
ery ǫ > 0 and sufficiently large n, there exists a (n,R−ǫ, ǫ) common-randomness
strong secrecy code. The common-randomness strong secrecy capacity
Cstrong(W,V ; cr) is the least upper bound of all achievable common-randomness
strong secrecy rates of (W,V ).
Since codes without common randomness are just a special case of common-
randomness codes, we have by construction that
Cstrong(W,V ) ≤ Cstrong(W,V ; cr).
Strong secrecy, i.e., the requirements of Equations (7) and (10), is the secrecy
criterion which has been used mostly in information-theoretic security until the
introduction of semantic security in [11]. It provides secrecy if the message ran-
dom variable is uniformly distributed. Inspired by cryptography, [11] introduced
semantic security, where the eavesdropper shall not obtain any information re-
gardless of the probability distribution of the message. We next state the cor-
responding definitions.
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Definition 3.6 (Semantic secrecy).
A code C = {(Em, Dm) : m ∈M} is an (n,R, ǫ) semantic secrecy code for
(W,V ) if
logM≥ nR (11)
e(C, n) < ǫ , (12)
max
M
χ
(
M ;EV ⊗n
)
< ǫ, (13)
where M is any random variable over the messages M.
R is an achievable semantic secrecy rate if for every ǫ > 0 and suffi-
ciently large n, there exists a (n,R− ǫ, ǫ) semantic secrecy code. The semantic
secrecy capacity Csem(W,V ) is the supremum of all achievable semantic se-
crecy rates of (W,V ).
Definition 3.7 (Common-randomness semantic secrecy).
A common-randomness code {Cs = {(Esm, Dsm) : m ∈M} : s ∈ S} is an (n,R, ǫ)
common-randomness semantic secrecy code for (W,V ) if
log |M| ≥ nR (14)
ESe(CS, n) < ǫ , (15)
max
M
χ(M ;S,ESV ⊗n) < ǫ , (16)
where M is any random variable over the messages M.
R is an achievable common-randomness semantic secrecy rate if
for every ǫ > 0 and sufficiently large n, there exists a (n,R − ǫ, ǫ) common-
randomness semantic secrecy code. The common-randomness semantic se-
crecy capacity Csem(W,V ; cr) is the supremum of all achievable common-
randomness semantic secrecy rates of (W,V ).
Just like for strong secrecy, and due to common-randomness codes being
more general, we have by construction
Csem(W,V ) ≤ Csem(W,V ; cr).
Similarly, the semantic secrecy condition is stronger, meaning that any semanti-
cally secure capacity achieving code family, is also a strongly secure code family
and thus
Csem(W,V ) ≤ Cstrong(W,V ),
Csem(W,V ; cr) ≤ Cstrong(W,V ; cr).
Since the maxima in Equation (13) and Equation (16) range over all possible
message distributions, semantic security in particular implies message indistin-
guishability. This means that even if the message random variable can only
assume one of two possible values known to the eavesdropper, the eavesdropper
cannot distinguish between these two messages. This is not implied by strong
secrecy alone.
Notice that since the leakage of the common-randomness codes in Equa-
tion (3) is computed against the state at the wiretap and the seed, bounding
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the leakage in the common-randomness capacities implies bounding the infor-
mation about the key carried by the seed. Thus the common randomness is not
required to be secure against eavesdropping, since the Equations (10) and (16)
impose that the seed carries no information, and thus it is considered to be
public.
3.3 Derandomization
Derandomization is a standard and widely used technique in information theory,
already used by Ahlswede in [1]. As a final result in this section, we apply the de-
randomization technique to good common-randomness semantic-security codes,
namely we construct a semantic-security code without common randomness us-
ing a transmission code and a common-randomness semantic-security code with
appropriate error scaling. These derandomized codes will essentially be able to
produce the common randomness needed to run the common-randomness codes
using an asymptotically small number of copies of the channel. The proof mimics
the classical case showed in [48].
A simple idea that uses too many channels to generate the seed, however,
is to alternate transmission codes and common-randomness semantic-secrecy
codes, use the transmission code to generate the seed, and use it only once in
the common randomness semantic-security code. Depending on the size of the
required seed, this may result in too many channels used just for the seed. The
solution is to simply reuse the seed, thus reducing the total size of |S| by sharing
the same s ∈ S for N common-randomness codes. We thus need to build (N+1)-
tuple of codewords as the new codewords. Each tuple is a composition of a first
codeword that generates the common-randomness and N common randomness-
assisted codewords to transmit the messages to the intended receiver. We start
by defining such codes.
Definition 3.8 (Derandomizing codes). Let n, n′, N ∈ N. Let
• {E′s, D′s}s∈S be an (n′, |S|) code,
• {{Esm, Dsm : m ∈M}: s ∈ S} be an (n, |S|, |M|) common-randomness code,
and define M¯ :=MN and for any m¯ ∈ M¯
Esm¯ := E
s
m1 · . . . ·EsmN Dsm¯ := Dsm1 ⊗ · · · ⊗DsmN .
We define their (n′ + nN, |M|N ) derandomized code C¯ to be the code (without
common randomness), such that for any message m¯ ∈ M¯
• the encoder samples from a uniform seed S and then, conditioned on the
values s, uses the Kronecker product encoder E′s · Esm¯, thus
E¯m¯ := ESE
′
S ·ESm¯, and
• the decoder for the message is the coarse graining of decoders over s
D¯m¯ :=
∑
s∈S
D′s ⊗Dsm¯.
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Note that the random seed in the derandomizing code becomes part of the
stochastic encoding process of the code. As we expect, the error and the leakage
of the derandomizing code is not worse than the sum of the errors and leakage
of all the codes used in the process. This can be easily proved by simply ap-
plying the standard techniques (cf. [3, 16]) for derandomization with uniform
distributed inputs on derandomization with arbitrary distributed inputs. Notice
that the standard proof of security (cf. [16]) is nothing more than applying the
quantum data processing inequality (cf. [49]) when we consider the derandomiz-
ing code as a function of its first part. Thus this argument works for any inputs
distribution. Nevertheless we give a proof for the sake of completeness.
Lemma 3.9. Let C′ be an (n′, 1n′ log |S|, ǫ′) transmission code, and let {Cs}s∈S
be an (n,R, ǫ) common-randomness semantic-secrecy code. Let n¯ := n′ + nN ,
then the N -derandomized code C¯ is an (n¯, nNn¯ R, ǫ′+ ǫN) semantic-secrecy code.
Proof. The N -derandomized code has size |M|N , thus the rate is N log |M|/n¯ ≥
nNR/n¯. We just need to bound the error and leakage of the new code.
For the error of C¯, by standard argument we have that for every m¯ ∈ M¯
E¯m¯W
⊗n¯(D¯cm¯)
= 1−
∑
s
1
|S|E
′
sW
⊗n′ ⊗ Esm1W⊗n ⊗ · · · ⊗ EsmNW⊗n(D¯m¯)
= 1−
∑
s,s′
1
|S|E
′
sW
⊗n′(D′s′)⊗ Esm1W⊗n(Ds
′
m1)⊗ · · · ⊗ EsmNW⊗n(Ds
′
mN )
≤ 1−
∑
s
1
|S|E
′
sW
⊗n′(D′s)⊗ Esm1W⊗n(Dsm1)⊗ · · · ⊗ EsmNW⊗n(DsmN )
≤ 1−
∑
s
1
|S| (1 − ǫ
′)(1− ǫ)N
≤ ǫ′ + ǫN,
and thus e(C¯, n¯) ≤ ǫ′ + ǫN .
For the leakage, since we are reusing the seed and the seed is shared via
the transmission code, a uniform seed does not map a random message to a
uniformly random input to the channel. Thus we need to reduce the security
to the security of the single codes. Recalling that the the Holevo information is
actually mutual information, by data processing and Equation (4), we have
χ
(
M¯ ; E¯V ⊗n¯
)
= χ
(
M¯ ;E′SV
⊗n′ ⊗ ESM¯V ⊗nN
)
≤ χ(M¯ ;S,ESM¯V ⊗nN)
≤ ESχ
(
M¯ ;ESM¯V
⊗nN
)
= ES
[
H
(
EM¯E
S
M¯V
⊗nN
)− EM¯H(ESM¯V ⊗nN)].
Since the message encoder is a Kronecker product of encoders, and the channel
is memoryless, we have H
(
ES
M¯
V ⊗nN
)
=
∑
H
(
ESMiV
⊗n
)
, and thus
χ(M¯ ; E¯V ⊗n¯) ≤ ES

H(EM¯ESM¯V ⊗nN)− EM¯ ∑
i=1,...,N
H(ESMiV
⊗n)

.
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This together with H(XY ) ≤ H(X)+H(Y ) applied to H(EM¯ESM¯V ⊗nN) gives
χ(M¯ ; E¯V ⊗n¯) ≤ ES

 ∑
i=1,...,N
H
(
EMiE
S
MiV
⊗n
)− ∑
i=1,...,N
EM¯H
(
ESMiV
⊗n
)
= ES
∑
i=1,...,N
χ
(
Mi;E
S
MiV
⊗n
)
=
∑
i=1,...,N
χ
(
Mi;S,E
S
MiV
⊗n
)
≤ ǫN ≤ ǫ′ + ǫN,
and the proof is concluded.
Notice that the argument works for any distribution of M¯ , the single uses
of the semantic-secrecy code do not need to have independent messages. This
is usually a point of difference with the derandomization techniques used for
strong secrecy. In strong secrecy M¯ is only required to be uniformly distributed,
which makes each Mi already independent and also uniformly distributed. This
allows for an easier but not fully general argument, since the leakage of the
derandomized code is actually equal to the sum of the leakages of the single
internal codes.
We will use the above in Section 5 to derandomize the explicit constructions
of semantic secrecy codes.
3.4 Quantum Channels
The results from classical secret message transmission over classical-quantum
channels can usually be carried over to fully quantum channels. Moreover, this
is optimal, in the sense that it is usually enough to just prepend a classical-
quantum preprocessing channel to many copies of the quantum channel and
then use the coding for the resulting classical-quantum channel. The extension
to quantum channels reduces to simply proving Corollary 4.2, which is straight-
forward and uses quite general arguments. More precisely, since the encoding of
classical messages for any quantum channel will need to map the classical mes-
sages to quantum states, the resulting effect at the sender is again a classical
quantum channel, and thus we can reduce the analysis to what we have done
so far for classical-quantum channels.
For classical and classical-quantum channels, the wiretap channel must be
given, in the sense that an assumption must be made about the output seen at
the eavesdropper, simply because the worst case scenario, that the eavesdropper
receives a noiseless copy of the input, is always physically possible. This is not
the case for quantum channels, where one of the aspects of no-cloning implies
that a copy of the input quantum state cannot be made, and the worst case
interaction with the environment can be deduced from the noise in the channel.
Since there is a limit to the information that it is leaked to the environment,
there is thus also a limit to the information of the eavesdropper, and we can
then remove any assumption in that respect, and identify the eavesdropper with
the environment [10, 26].
Let now P and Q be quantum systems, and letW be a quantum channel. We
assume, as usual in the quantum setting, the worst case scenario, namely that
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the environment E is completely under the control of the eavesdropper, which
is in contrast with the classical and classical-quantum setting where this worst
case scenario does not allow for secrecy. This automatically defines the wiretap
channel (W,V ) for any given quanutm channel W to the intended receiver.
However the results below work in general for any allowed pair of quantum
channels (W,V ) on the same input.
Definition 3.10. A quantum wiretap channel from a sender P to a receiver Q
with eavesdropper E is a pair of complementary channels (W,V ), where W :
S(HP) → S(HQ) and V : S(HP) → S(HE) are defined as W (ρ) = trE (UρU∗)
and V (ρ) = trQ (UρU
∗) for some isometry U : HP → HQ ⊗HE.
Remark 3.11. Without the assumption that the eavesdropper might have full
access to the environment, the treatment of the semantic secrecy capacity is
still the same. In this case the wiretap channel must be specified explicitly as
(W,V ), where both W and V are quantum channels. However not all pairs are
allowed, as V must be a channel that can be recovered from the environment.
The generalization is that W and V must be of the form W = trER (UρU
∗) and
V = trQR (UρU
∗), where now the isometry U : HP → HQ ⊗HE ⊗HR maps to
three systems, the intended receiver, the eavesdropper, and an environment not
in possession of the eavesdropper.
We can transmit both classical and quantum information over quantum
channels. For the transmission of classical information via a quantum channel,
we first have to convert a classical message into a quantum state. We assume
that the states produced in the input system are constructed depending on the
value of x ∈ X , where X is a finite set of letters. Let thus F : X → S(HP)
be this classical-quantum channel. The composition with a quantum channelW
defines the classical-quantum channel W ◦F : X → S(HQ); to keep a consistent
notation we define FW ≡ W ◦ F . With this notation, the definitions present
only minimal changes in comparison to the classical-quantum wiretap channels
above. A code for the quantum channels now simply needs to input quantum
states instead of classical values.
Definition 3.12. An (n, |M|) quantum code for a quantum channel W con-
sists of a finite set C = {Em, Dm : m ∈M}, where the stochastic encoder E :
M→ S(H⊗nP ) is a classical-quantum channel, and the decoders {Dm : m ∈M}
form a sub-POVM.
The error of C is defined as
e(C, n) := 1|M| maxm∈MEmW
⊗n(Dcm) .
The leakage of a message random variable M over M is defined as
χ
(
M ;EmV
⊗n
)
,
where V is the complementary channel to the environment.
The rates and capacities can then be defined exactly as is done for classical-
quantum channels. Since we will use these definitions only briefly in Corol-
lary 4.2, we limit ourselves to directly defining the capacities.
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Definition 3.13. The strong secrecy capacity Cstrong(W ) is the largest real
number such that for every ǫ > 0 and sufficiently large n there exists a finite set
X and an (n, |M|) code C = {Em, Dm : m ∈ M}, such that
log |M| > n(Cstrong(W )− ǫ) (17)
e(C, n) < ǫ , (18)
χ
(
U ;EmV
⊗n
)
< ǫ, (19)
where U is the uniform random variable over M.
Definition 3.14. The semantic secrecy capacity of W , denoted by Csem(W ) is
the largest real number such that for every ǫ > 0 and sufficiently large n there
exists an (n, |M|) code C = {Em, Dm : m ∈ M}, such that for any random
variable M with arbitrary distribution on M
log |M| > n(R− ǫ) (20)
e(C, n) < ǫ , (21)
χ
(
M ;EmV
⊗n
)
< ǫ . (22)
Notice that the choice of environment channel does not affect the definitions
of capacity. Let V and V ′ be two distinct complementary channels to W , then
V ′ and V are equivalent in the sense that there is a partial isometry U such that
for all input states ρ ∈ S(HP) we have V ′(ρ) = U∗V (ρ)U [39, 33]. The action
of the partial isometry is reversible and thus the leakage is the same (being a
mutual information, which is non-increasing under local operations). Therefore
the security criteria in Definitions 3.13 and 3.14 does not depend on the choice
of complementary channel.
With the definitions in place, the following sections are dedicated to prove
our results. In Section 4 we prove that we can change any strong secrecy capacity
achieving codes into semantic secrecy capacity achieving codes. However the re-
sult is non constructive, which is why in Section 5 we provide a semi-constructive
proof where we concatenate functions to suitable transmission codes to convert
them into semantic secrecy capacity achieving codes. The final section is ded-
icated to generalizing the results from classical quantum channels to quantum
channels.
4 Semantic Secrecy Capacity
In this section we prove that the two semantic secrecy capacities of classical-
quantum channels are equal
Cw(W,V ) := sup
n→∞
1
n
max
P,E
(χ(P ;EW⊗n)− χ(P ;EV ⊗n)), (23)
where "w" stands for wiretap, and the maximum is taken over finite input sets
M, input probability distributions P on M, and classical channels E : M →
P (Xn).
Cw(W,V ) was first proven in [26] to equal the strong secrecy capacity of
the classical-quantum wiretap channel. The result was extended in [17] to the
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Cw(W,V )
Cstrong(W,V ; cr)
Cstrong(W,V )
Csem(W,V ; cr)
Csem(W,V )
Cw(W,V )
=
[26, 17]
= [26, 17]
≥
≥
≥
≥
Theorem 4.1
Figure 3: Relationship between the secrecy capacities and the coding theorems.
The inequalities without reference are obvious and follow from the definitions;
allowing common randomness can only increase the capacity. Similarly, relaxing
from semantically secure code to strongly secure codes can only increase the
capacity. It follows from Cw(W,V ) being both the upper bound and the lower
bound, that all the quantities are equal.
common-randomness strong secrecy capacity as a particular case of arbitrarily-
varying classical-quantum wiretap channels. Namely, we have
Cstrong(W,V ; cr) = Cstrong(W,V ) = Cw(W,V ). (24)
For now we will not actually use the explicit expression of Cw. Since a semanti-
cally secure code is always also strongly secure, the converse theorems for strong
secrecy are also strong converses for semantic secrecy, as displayed schematically
in Figure 3. Thus, we only need to prove Csem(W,V ) ≥ Cstrong(W,V ). In Theo-
rem 4.1 we prove this, and show that we can convert a strong secrecy code into
a semantic secrecy code without asymptotic rate loss.
Theorem 4.1. Let (W,V ) be a classical-quantum wiretap channel. With the
same notation as in Equation (24), we have
Csem(W,V ) = Csem(W,V ; cr) = Cstrong(W,V ) = Cw(W,V ).
Proof. As it is already explained and displayed in Figure 3, we only need to prove
the direct part. Moreover we do not need to prove the direct part explicitly, but
it suffices to show that
Csem(W,V ) ≥ Cstrong(W,V ).
For this, we are going to take a code which achieves strong secrecy capacity. This
code has asymptotically small mutual information between uniform messages
and the wiretapper. We consider a message subset, for which we will keep only
half of the messages which have the lowest distinguishability. Then we upper
bound the mutual information between any distribution on this subset and the
wiretapper.
16
Inspection of the proof of [26, Theorem 1] shows that all achievable strong
secrecy rates of (W,V ), in particular Cstrong(W,V ), are achievable in a stronger
sense, namely, with exponentially decreasing error probability and leakage. For-
mally, this means that for any ǫ > 0 there exists a δ > 0 such that for all
sufficiently large n, there exists an (n, |Mn|) strong secrecy code Cn satisfying
|Mn| ≥ 2n(Cstrong(W,V )−ǫ),
e(Cn, n) ≤ 2−nδ,
χ(Un;EV
⊗n) ≤ 2−nδ,
where Un is the uniform distribution overMn, and E is the encoder of the code.
We may also assume that n is large enough for
|Mn| ≤ 2n(Cstrong(W,V )+ε) (25)
to hold (this follows immediately from the definition of Cstrong(W,V ) as the
largest achievable strong secrecy rate).
We start by first showing that there is a subcode C′n of size M′n ≥ Mn/2
such that all messages are close to each other in trace norm in terms of the
output distribution they generate at the wiretapper. We will denote the output
states and their average at the wiretap as
ρm :=
∑
xn∈Xn
E(xn|m)V ⊗n(xn) ρ := 1|Mn|
∑
m∈Mn
ρm
Now let HMn be a |Mn|-dimensional Hilbert space with a basis {|m〉 : m ∈
Mn}. We define the following two quantum states
σ :=
1
|Mn|
∑
m∈Mn
|m〉〈m| ⊗ ρm µ := 1|Mn|
∑
m∈Mn
|m〉〈m| (26)
so that, as per Equation (1), we can write the Holevo information using the
relative entropy as χ(Un;EV
⊗n) = D(σ‖µ ⊗ ρ). By the Quantum Pinsker in-
equality [30] we have
‖σ − µ⊗ ρ‖21 ≤ D(σ‖µ⊗ ρ) · 2 ln 2 = χ(Un;EV ⊗n) · 2 ln 2 ≤ 2−nδ+1 ln 2
and thus
1
|Mn|
∑
m∈Mn
‖ρm − ρ‖1 = ‖σ − µ⊗ ρ‖1 ≤ 2−nδ/2+1 . (27)
Thus there exists a M′n ⊂Mn such that |M′n| ≥ 12 |Mn| and
‖ρm − ρ‖1 ≤ 2−nδ/2+2 (28)
for all m ∈M′n (otherwise, if such a set did not exist, then Equation (27) could
not be true). By restricting the original code C to the message subset M′, we
obtain a subcode X ′.
We just proved that we can construct a large subcode X ′ out of the strong
secrecy code C such that X ′ satisfies pairwise message indistinguishability in
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terms of the trace norm distance. Next, we translate message indistinguisha-
bility into semantic security via standard arguments. Let P be any probability
distribution P on the new message set M′n. We need to bound
χ(P ;E′V ⊗n), (29)
where E′ is the encoder of the subcode C′. For this we use the continuity prop-
erties of the mutual information. According the tight bound proven in [45], for
any state σ′ on systems A and B with marginal µ′ on A of finite dimension d,
and any state ρ′ on B of arbitrary dimension, it holds
I(A ∧B)′σ = |I(A ∧B)σ′ − I(A ∧B)µ⊗ρ′ | ≤ 2ǫ′ log d+ g(ǫ′), (30)
where ǫ′ = 12‖σ′ − µ′ ⊗ ρ′‖1, and g(ǫ′) := (1 + ǫ′)h(ǫ′/1 + ǫ′), with h the binary
entropy. We apply this to the Holevo quantity from Equation (29) that we want
to bound, which is the mutual information of the state
σ′ :=
∑
m′∈M′n
Pm′ |m〉〈m| ⊗ ρm
with marginal
µ′ :=
∑
m′∈M′n
Pm′ |m′〉〈m′| .
From Equation (28) we directly have a bound on ǫ′ = 12‖σ′ − µ′ ⊗ ρ‖1 as
ǫ′ =
1
2
∑
m′∈M′n
Pm′‖ρm′ − ρ‖1 ≤ 2−nδ/2+1
and thus by Equation (30) we have
χ(P ;E′V ⊗n) ≤ 2−nδ/2+2 log |M′n|+ g(2−nδ/2+2). (31)
By (25), the right-hand side of (31) tends to zero exponentially as n tends to
infinity, so we can choose a 0 < δ′ < δ such that
χ(P ;E′V ⊗n) ≤ 2−nδ′ . (32)
This gives us the desired upper bound on Equation (29).
Since δ′ < δ and e(C′n, n) ≤ e(Cn, n), we also have
e(C′n, n) ≤ 2−nδ
′
. (33)
Finally, since M′n contains at least half of the messages of Mn, we have
M′n ≥ 2n(Cstrong(W,V )−ǫ)−1 = 2n(Cstrong(W,V )−ǫ−
1
n
). (34)
Equations (32) to (34) together show that by constructing C′n from Cn, one loses
no rate asymptotically, while the C′n are semantic secrecy codes with exponen-
tially decreasing leakage and error. In particular, Cstrong(W,V ) is an achievable
rate for semantic security. This proves the claim Csem(W,V ) ≥ Cstrong(W,V ).
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Quantum Channels
Let W now be a quantum channel, thus defining the quantum wiretap channel
to be the complementary channel to the environment. Just like the case of
the classical-quantum channel, the strong and semantic secrecy capacities are
equal. This time, rather than transforming a strong secrecy code into a semantic
secrecy code, we simply generalize the result from classical-quantum channels
to quantum channels, in the same way it was done for strong secrecy in [26].
In [26] it was proven that the strong secrecy capacity Cstrong(W ) can be
computed using the following multi-letter formula.
Cstrong(W ) = sup
n∈N
1
n
sup
X ,F,P
(
χ(P, FW⊗n)− χ(P, FV ⊗n)) , (35)
where V is the channel to the environment defined byW . The supremum is taken
over all chosen finite sets X , classical/quantum channels F : X → S(H⊗nP ), and
probability distributions P on X . Notice how the classical-quantum channel is
allowed to output entangled states between the inputs of the channels.
Just like for classical-quantum channels, any semantic secrecy code is also
a strong secrecy code, and the strong secrecy capacity is a converse on the
semantic secrecy capacity. Again, we only need the achievability proof. The
achievability of this rate follows directly from the achievability of the wiretap
capacity for classical-quantum channels. Since the proof is actually independent
of the structure of the secrecy criterion, the same proof for strong secrecy also
works for semantic secrecy.
Corollary 4.2. Let W be a quantum channel. We have
Csem(W ) = sup
n∈N
1
n
sup
X ,F,P
(
χ(P, FW⊗n)− χ(P, FV ⊗n)) . (36)
Proof. We prove the claim for any fixed n, X , P and F , namely that
1
n
(
χ(P, FW⊗n)− χ(P, FV ⊗n))
is an achievable rate, the supremum then follows automatically.
Notice that χ(P, FW⊗n) − χ(P, FV ⊗n) is already an achievable rate for
the classical-quantum channel (FW⊗n, FV ⊗n), and thus for all ǫ > 0 and
all n′ there exist an (n′, χ(P, FW⊗n) − χ(P, FV ⊗n) − ǫ, ǫ) code {Em, Dm} for
(FW⊗n, FV ⊗n) as proven in the previous sections. It follows by construction
and definition that
{
EmF
⊗n′ , Dm
}
is a (n′n, χ(P, FW⊗n)−χ(P, FV ⊗n)− ǫ, ǫ)
code for W with rate divided by n.
Since we can reduce the classical semantic secrecy capacity of quantum chan-
nels to the one of classical-quantum wiretap channels, we can restrict ourselves
to the latter in our analysis.
We have proven that whenever strong secrecy is achievable, then semantic
security is also achievable. However, the proof technique does not tell us how to
practically construct such codes, and the subset of semantically secure messages
chosen in Theorem 4.1 will in general depend on the channel and the code. In
the next section we will address this issue and show how to construct such codes,
similar to how hash functions are used to achieve strong secrecy.
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5 Semantic Security with BRI Functions
As already mentioned above, the achievability proof in Section 4 is only an
existence statement, and does not answer the question of how to choose the
semantically secure message subsets. In this Section we introduce BRI functions
and use them to construct semantic secrecy capacity achieving BRI modular
codes in Theorem 5.12, thus also providing an alternative to the achievabil-
ity proof of Theorem 4.1 in the previous section. We will construct such codes
requiring common randomness, and will at first only show achievability via
common-randomness BRI modular codes. An additional derandomization step
will be required to construct codes without common randomness. The idea be-
hind the construction of semantic-secrecy BRI modular codes is similar to the
way in which strong secrecy codes are constructed, using first a transmission
code to correct all the errors, but substituting the use of strongly universal hash
functions with the use of BRI functions to erase the information held by the
eavesdropper. Just like hash functions, BRI functions require a random seed
known to the sender and receiver, which is why we provide it as common ran-
domness. Providing the seed via common randomness makes construction easier
and the proof conceptually clear. However, the assumption of common random-
ness as an additional resource is quite strong. In the end of the section we prove
that the random seed can be generated by the sender and be made known to
the receiver using the channel without sacrificing capacity, a process known as
derandomization.
5.1 BRI functions
We will define define what biregular irreducible (BRI) functions are in this
subsection, and prove the key properties that we will use to achieve semantic
security. The properties we will prove are independent of communication prob-
lems like the classical-quantum wiretap channels we consider. They are simply
related to the structure of BRI functions and how they are used as an input
to classical-quantum channels. Thus the channels and the input spaces in this
subsection are not to be confused with the actual wiretap channel and its inputs,
as will be made clearer below.
We will be looking at families of functions fs(x), namely functions of two
inputs f : S × X → N , and at their preimages in X
f−1s (m) := {x ∈ X : fs(x) = m},
where s ∈ S will be the seeds in construction of the modular codes.
Definition 5.1 (Biregular functions). Let S, X , N be finite sets. A function
f : S × X → N is called biregular if there exists a regularity set M ⊆ N such
that for every m ∈M
a) dS := |{x : fs(x) = m}| = |f−1s (m)| is non-zero and independent of s;
b) dX := |{s : fs(x) = m}| is non-zero and independent of x.
For any biregular function f : S × X → N and any m ∈ M we can define a
doubly stochastic matrix Pf,m [48] with coefficients defined as
Pf,m(x, x
′) :=
1
dSdX
· |{s : fs(x) = fs(x′) = m}|. (37)
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In other words, Pf,m(x, x
′) is the normalized number of seeds s ∈ S such that
both x and x′ are in the preimage f−1s (m). Since Pf,m is stochastic, its largest
eigenvalue is 1 and we define λ2(f,m) to be the second largest singular value of
Pf,m.
Definition 5.2 (BRI functions). Let S, X , N be finite sets. A biregular func-
tion f : S × X → N is called irreducible if 1 is a simple eigenvalue of Pf,m,
namely if λ2(f,m) < 1, for every m ∈ M.
Notice that dS and dX might depend onm. However, for the known BRI function
construction these are indeed a constant parameter [48].
Biregularity puts a strong restriction on the behaviour of the function. In
particular, any m is a possible output of any s or x, with the right (s, x) pair. If
for a fix m we consider the incidence matrix Isx = δm,fs(x), which we can think
of it as representing the m section of the graph of fs(x), then we can visualize
items a) and b) as Isx having the same number of 1’s in each row, and similarly
in each column. For example, ignoring definition 5.2 and omitting the zeros, a
possible Isx for a given m might look like
X
S


1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1


with dS = 4 and dX = 3. An important consequence is the following relation
dX |X | = dS |S|, (38)
easily derived from
|{(s, x) : fs(x) = m}| =
∑
s
|{x : fs(x) = m} | =
∑
s
dS = dS |S|
=
∑
x
|{s : fs(x) = m} | =
∑
x
dX = dX |X |.
In [48] it was shown that for every d ≥ 3 and k ∈ N, there exists a BRI function
f : S × S →M, satisfying |S| = 2kd, |M| = 2k and
λ2(f,m) ≤ 4
d
. (39)
For our constructions, the above is all we need to know, we will not need to
know how these functions are constructed.
The above are key features that are used to provide security. BRI functions
play the equivalent role of hash functions for strong secrecy, so we need to show
how they can be used to reduce the Holevo information at the output of the
channel, which is what we will do in the remainder of the subsection. This
channel must not be confused with the wiretap, which we will consider only
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later in the next subsection. For the rest of this subsection we fix a finite set X ,
a quantum system H , a classical-quantum channel
V : X → S(H),
where V is not necessarily a wiretap, and the random variables
S uniform random variable over the seed S
M random variable over the message M
which are always assumed to be independent. In the next subsection, V will
actually be the composition of the encoder of the transmission code with the
actual wiretap; thus X will be the message space of the transmission code. The
space M will be the message space of the wiretap code and S the space of the
common randomness. Given a seed s, the encoding of a message m happens by
picking an uniformly random element of the preimage f−1s (m). The definition
of BRI functions and these conditions, then, are such that fixing the message
and choosing the seed at random produces a uniformly random encoding, as will
be explained now more precisely. For this pupose, with some abuse of notation,
we will allow classical-quantum channels to take subsets as inputs, with the
convention that the resulting state is the uniform mixture over the outputs of
the elements in the set. Namely, for D ⊆ X we will define
V (D) := 1|D|
∑
x∈D
V (x),
in particular, the above defines
V ◦ f−1s (m) =
1
dS
∑
x∈f−1s (m)
V (x),
V (X ) = 1|X |
∑
x∈X
V (x),
which we will repeatedly use. In particular, from Equation (38), stating that
dX |X | = dS |S|, it follows immediately that
P [f−1S (m) = x] =
1
|S|
∑
s
1
dS
1{fs(x)=m} =
dX
dS |S| =
1
|X | , (40)
and thus for any m ∈M
ESV ◦ f−1S (m) = V (X ), (41)
which means that not knowing the seed makes the output independent of the
message.
We can now start bounding the information at the output of the channel
V , and ultimately will need to be able to show the semantic secrecy condi-
tions. As said, we focus for now on the common-randomness semantic security,
Equation (16) of Definition 3.7, which means bounding the leakage defined in
Equation (3) of Definition 3.3. We do this in general for the output of any chan-
nel, irrespective of actual encodings, and therefore will upper bound a general
leakage χ
(
M ;S, V ◦ f−1S
)
. We begin by converting the leakage from a Holevo
quantity to a relative entropy.
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Lemma 5.3. For any random variable M over M independent of the uniform
seed S, it holds
χ(M ;S, V ◦ f−1S ) ≤ maxm∈MESD
(
V ◦ f−1S (m)
∥∥V (X )).
Proof. Denote σs,m := V ◦ f−1s (m). We have
χ(M ;S, V ◦ f−1S )
=
1
S
∑
s
S
(
1
M
∑
m
σs,m
)
− 1S
1
M
∑
s
∑
m
S (σs,m)
= S
(
1
S
1
M
∑
s
∑
m
σs,m
)
− 1S
1
M
∑
s
∑
m
S (σs,m)− χ(S;V ◦ f−1S )
= χ(M,S;V ◦ f−1S )− χ(S;V ◦ f−1S )
therefore,
χ(M ;S, V ◦ f−1S ) ≤ χ(M,S;V ◦ f−1S )
= EMESD
(
V ◦ f−1S (M)
∥∥EMESV ◦ f−1S (M))
≤ max
m∈M
ESD
(
V ◦ f−1S (m)
∥∥EMESV ◦ f−1S (M)).
the equality holds because of Equation (2), where we consider the classical-
quantum channel S × X → S(H ′) that maps (s, x) to V ◦ f−1s (m). It only
remains to show that
EMESV ◦ f−1S (M) = V (X ),
but this follows immediately from Equation (41), namely from ESV ◦ f−1S (m) =
V (X ), and the proof is concluded.
For the next step we will define subnormalized classical-quantum channels.
Later we will project onto the typical subspace, and discard the rest.
Definition 5.4. Let ǫ ≥ 0. An ǫ-subnormalized classical-quantum channel V ′ :
X → L(H) is a map satisfying V ′(x) ≥ 0 and 1 − ǫ ≤ tr V ′(x) ≤ 1, for all
x ∈ X . Since for ǫ > ǫ′, an ǫ-subnormalized channel is also ǫ′-subnormal, we
call all 0-subnormalized classical-quantum channels simply subnormal.
Now let V : X → S(H) be a classical-quantum channel. Let V ′ : X → L(H) be
a subnormalized classical-quantum channel. We say that
V ′ ≤ V
if V ′(x) ≤ V (x) for all x ∈ X .
The ordering definition reflects what we obtain when we project a channel
on a subspace, we obtain a subnormalized channel that is less than the original
channel in an operator ordering sense. When we project onto the typical sub-
space, we only change the channel a little, and we want to make sure that our
upper bound only changes a little. This is the statement of the next lemma.
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Lemma 5.5. Let V : X → S(H) be a classical quantum channel. Let ǫ > 0.
Let V ′ : X → L(H) be an ǫ-subnormalized classical quantum channel such that
V ′ ≤ V . Then for any fixed m ∈ M, it holds
ESD
(
V ◦ f−1S (m) ‖ V (X )
) ≤ ESD (V ′ ◦ f−1S (m) ‖ V ′(X ))+ ǫ log |X |dS .
Proof. Let ρ, ρ′, σ, and σ′ be subnormalized quantum states on the same system
such that the sum is a normalized state, namely so that tr(ρ+ ρ′) = tr(σ + σ′) =
1. Consider classical-quantum states of the form |0〉〈0| ⊗ ρ + |1〉〈1| ⊗ ρ′ and
|0〉〈0| ⊗ σ + |1〉〈1| ⊗ σ′. By monotonicity of the relative entropy (cf. Section 2)
under the trace, we note that
D(ρ+ ρ′ ‖ σ + σ′)
≤ D(|0〉〈0| ⊗ ρ+ |1〉〈1| ⊗ ρ′ ‖ |0〉〈0| ⊗ σ + |1〉〈1| ⊗ σ′)
= D(ρ ‖ σ) +D(ρ′ ‖ σ′).
We define V ∆ := V − V ′ and apply the above to
ρ := V ′ ◦ f−1s (m) ρ′ := V ∆ ◦ f−1s (m)
σ := V ′(X ) σ′ := V ∆(X ),
which satisfy V ◦ f−1s (m) = ρ+ ρ′ and V (X ) = σ + σ′, and obtain
D
(
V ◦ f−1s (m) ‖ V (X )
)
≤ D (V ′ ◦ f−1s (m) ‖ V ′(X ))+D (V ∆ ◦ f−1s (m) ‖ V ∆(X )) . (42)
Notice that
V ∆ ◦ f−1s (m) =
1
dS
∑
x∈f−1s (m)
V ∆(x) ≤ 1
dS
∑
x∈X
V ∆(x) =
|X |
dS
V ∆(X ).
This implies that supp(V ∆ ◦ f−1s (m)) ⊂ supp(V ∆(X )) and by operator mono-
tonicity of the logarithm (cf. [13]), that log
(
V ∆ ◦ f−1s (m)
) ≤ log(V ∆(X )). Thus
D
(
V ∆ ◦ f−1s (m) ‖ V ∆(X )
)
= tr
[
V ∆ ◦ f−1s (m) ·
(
logV ∆ ◦ f−1s (m)− logV ∆(X )
)]
≤ tr
[
V ∆ ◦ f−1s (m) ·
(
log
[ |X |
dS
V ∆(X )
]
− logV ∆(X )
)]
= tr
[
V ∆ ◦ f−1s (m) · log
|X |
dS
]
≤ ǫ log |X |
dS
,
where we used that tr V ∆ ◦ f−1s (m) ≤ ǫ. Plugging this into Equation (42), we
obtain the claim.
Lemma 5.6. Let ǫ > 0 and let V ′ : X → S(H) be an ǫ-subnormalized classical-
quantum channel. For any fixed m ∈M, it holds
ESD
(
V ′ ◦ f−1S (m)
∥∥V ′(X )) ≤ logES exp (D2(V ′ ◦ f−1S (m)∥∥V ′(X )))+ ǫ.
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Lemma 5.6 is just the quantum version of Lemma 23 in [48] and can be shown
by similar techniques. For the sake of completeness, we deliver a proof here.
Proof. By the ordering relation and the convergence of α-Rényi relative entropy
for quantum states we mentioned in Section 2, it holds that D(ρ ‖ σ) ≤ D2(ρ ‖
σ), and thus we can bound any relative entropy term D(pρ ‖ qσ), where p and
q are probabilities, and ρ and σ are states such that supp(rho) ⊂ supp(σ) with
the 2-Rényi relative entropy as follows (notice that Equation (43) holds trivially
if supp(ρ) is not in supp(σ)):
D(pρ ‖ qσ) = pD(ρ ‖ σ) + p log p
q
≤ pD2(ρ ‖ σ) + p log p
q
= p tr log[ρ2σ−1] + p log
p
q
= p tr log[(pρ)2(qσ)−1]− p log p
= pD2(pρ ‖ qσ) + (1− p)
≤ D2(pρ ‖ qσ) + (1 − p), (43)
where we used −p log p ≤ 1− p.
We apply this to
pρ := V ′ ◦ f−1s (m) qσ := V ′(X )
which gives
1− p = 1− tr V ′ ◦ f−1s (m) ≤ ǫ
and thus
D(V ′ ◦ f−1s (m) ‖ V ′(X )) ≤ D2
(
V ′ ◦ f−1s (m) ‖ V ′(X )
)
+ ǫ .
We apply the expectation value on both sides, and by the convexity of the
exponential function we have
ESD(V
′ ◦ f−1s (m) ‖ V ′(X )) ≤ ESD2
(
V ′ ◦ f−1S (m)
∥∥V ′(X )) + ǫ
≤ logES expD2
(
V ′ ◦ f−1S (m) ‖ V ′(X )
)
+ ǫ .
This concludes the proof.
Lemma 5.7. Let V ′ : X → L(H) be a subnormalized classical-quantum chan-
nel. For every m ∈M we have
ES expD2
(
V ′ ◦ f−1S (m) ‖ V ′(X )
)
≤ λ2(f,m) rank[V ′(X )]max
x∈X
‖V ′(x)‖∞ + 1, (44)
where λ2(f,m) is the second largest singular value of the Pf,m defined in Equa-
tion (37), and the expectation value is over uniformly random s ∈ S.
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Proof. Recall that if supp(ρ) ⊂ supp(σ) then expD2(ρ ‖ σ) = tr
(
ρ2σ−1
)
, where
σ−1 is the pseudo-inverse. By linearity, the definition of the BRI function, and
by expanding the mixtures, for every m we obtain
ES expD2
(
V ′ ◦ f−1S (m) ‖ V ′(X )
)
= ES tr
[
(V ′ ◦ f−1S (m))2V ′(X )−1
]
=
1
|S|
∑
s∈S
tr

 1
d2S
∑
x,x′∈X
V ′(x)δm,fs(x)δm,fs(x′)V
′(x′)(V ′(X ))−1


=
dX
|S|dS
∑
x,x′∈X
tr
[
V ′(x)
1
dSdX
∑
s∈S
δfs(x),mδfs(x′),mV
′(x′)(V ′(X ))−1
]
=
1
|X |
∑
x,x′∈X
tr
[
V ′(x)Pf,m(x, x
′)V ′(x′)(V ′(X ))−1]
where we applied the expression of Pf,m from Definition 5.2, and then Equa-
tion (38).
Let now ρ and σ be two states with supp(ρ) ⊂ supp(σ). Let {|vi〉} be an
orthonormal basis of eigenvectors for σ and let ρij = 〈vi| ρ |vj〉, then
tr
(
ρ2σ−1
)
=
∑
ij
ρijρjiσ
−1
ii .
Notice that supp(V (x)) ⊂ supp(V (X )) for all x, so we can apply this to the
above. Let {λi : i} be the non-zero eigenvalues of V (X ) with a set of orthonormal
eigenvectors {|vi〉 : i}. We now use the notation V ′ij for the functions V ′ij(x) =
〈vi|V ′(x) |vj〉. Because V ′(x) are Hermitian, we have V ′ij = V ′∗ji, and thus we
can write
ES expD2
(
V ′ ◦ f−1S (m) ‖ V ′(X )
)
=
1
|X |
∑
x,x′∈X
∑
ij
V ′ij(x)Pf,m(x, x
′)V ′ji(x
′)
1
V ′ii(X )
=
1
|X |
∑
ij
1
V ′ii(X ) 〈V
′
ij |Pf,m
∣∣V ′ij〉 , (45)
where |V ′ij〉 are complex vectors in CX .
We now use the following well-known result (see, e.g., [22]) (orignally stated
for real vectors – see Lemma 5.9 for the generalization of the proof to complex
vectors). Pf,m is a symmetric stochastic matrix in an |X | dimensional real space
with λ2(f,m) < 1 denoting the second-largest eigenvalue. By construction and
assumption, 1 is the largest eigenvalue and it is simple (non-degenerate). Then,
for any two vectors in ω and ω′ in this space, it holds that
〈ω|Pf,m |ω〉 ≤ λ2(f,m) 〈ω|ω〉+ 〈ω|1〉〈1|ω〉 , (46)
where |1〉 is the the normalized all-one vector, namely 〈1| = 1√
|X |
(1, . . . , 1).
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We thus have
ES expD2
(
V ′ ◦ f−1S (m) ‖ V ′(X )
)
≤
∑
ij
|X |−1
V ′ii(X ) [λ2(f,m) 〈V
′
ij |V ′ij〉+ 〈V ′ij |1〉 〈1|V ′ij〉]
However, notice that by contruction,
〈V ′|ij |1〉 〈1|V ′ij〉 = |X | · V ′∗ij(X ) · V ′ij(X ) = |X |δij(V ′ii(X ))2,
because the choice of basis is an eigenbasis of V ′(X ). We can thus simplify the
expression to
ES expD2
(
V ′ ◦ f−1S (m) ‖ V ′(X )
)
≤ 1|X |λ2(f,m)
∑
ij
〈V ′ij |V ′ij〉
V ′ii(X ) +
∑
i
V ′ii(X )
=
1
|X |λ2(f,m)
∑
ij
∑
x V
′
ij(x)V
′
ji(x)
V ′ii(X ) + tr[V
′(X )]
=
1
|X |λ2(f,m)
∑
x
tr
[
V ′
2
(x)(V ′(X ))−1
]
+ 1.
Now we focus on
∑
x tr
[
V ′2(x)(V ′(X ))−1
]
. We repeatedly use the cyclic prop-
erty of the trace and trAB ≤ ‖A‖∞ tr |B|, together with the positivity of the
states, to obtain the following∑
x
tr
[
V ′
2
(x)(V ′(X ))−1
]
≤
∑
x
‖V ′(x)‖∞ tr
(√
V ′(x)(V ′(X ))−1
√
V (x)
)
≤ max
x∈X
‖V ′(x)‖∞
∑
x
tr
[
V ′(x)(V ′(X ))−1]
= max
x∈X
‖V ′(x)‖∞ · |X | · tr
[
V ′(X )(V ′(X ))−1]
= max
x∈X
‖V ′(x)‖∞ · |X | · rank(V ′(X )). (47)
Now we join everything together and obtain
ES expD2
(
(V ′ ◦ f−1S )(m) ‖ V ′(X )
)
≤ λ2(f,m) rank[V ′(X )]max
x∈X
‖V ′(x)‖∞ + 1, (48)
as claimed.
Note that the bound in Lemma 5.7 is technically different from the clas-
sical version in [48, Lemma 26], which bounds the leakage in terms of a max
mutual information. As for now, we are only able to prove the lemma for finite
dimensional quantum systems, while the classical version is valid also for infinite
classical systems.
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Remark 5.8. Using different type of functions instead of BRI functions, Hayashi
and Matsumoto [31] show a lemma similar to Lemma 5.7 in the case of a single
message (i.e., for resolvability) and for ordinary classical channels. It is straight-
forward to extend this to the case of several messages and subnormalized chan-
nels. The function class of Hayashi and Matsumoto is defined via the function
inverses in terms of group homomorphisms. The example given in [31], while
efficiently computable, requires a longer seed than the best-known BRI function,
which is not known to be efficiently computable.
For completeness, the proof of Equation (46) follows here. Afterwards, we
will continue the chain of inequalities and bound the V dependent term of
Lemma 5.7.
Lemma 5.9. Let P be a symmetric stochastic real matrix in a |X | dimensional
complex space and let the eigenvalue 1 be simple. Denote the second-largest
eigenvalue modulus P by λ2. For every vector |ω〉 in this space, it holds
〈ω|P |ω〉 ≤ λ2 〈ω|ω〉+ 〈ω|1〉〈1|ω〉 ,
where |1〉 is the the normalized all-one vector, namely 〈1| = 1√
|X |
(1, . . . , 1).
Proof. Notice that being doubly stochastic implies satisfying P |1〉 = |1〉 and
〈1|P = 〈1|. We first add and remove the |1〉 component from |ω〉:
〈ω|P |ω〉
= (〈ω| − 〈ω|1〉〈1|)P (|ω〉 − |1〉〈1|ω〉)
+ 〈ω|1〉〈1|P |ω〉+ 〈ω|P |1〉〈1|ω〉 − 〈ω|1〉〈1|P |1〉〈1|ω〉
= (〈ω| − 〈ω|1〉〈1|)P (|ω〉 − |1〉〈1|ω〉) + 〈ω|1〉〈1|ω〉
because 1 is a simple eigenvalue, in the remaining subspace the largest eigenvalue
is λ2. Since λ2 is positive for such a matrix [22], we have
〈ω|P |ω〉
≤ (〈ω| − 〈ω|1〉〈1|)λ2(|ω〉 − |1〉〈1|ω〉) + 〈ω|1〉〈1|ω〉
= λ2(〈ω|ω〉 − 〈ω|1〉〈1|ω〉) + 〈ω|1〉〈1|ω〉
≤ λ2 〈ω|ω〉+ 〈ω|1〉〈1|ω〉 .
Putting all the results above together we obtain the following single state-
ment for BRI functions.
Corollary 5.10. Let ǫ > 0 and let V ′ : X → L(H) be an ǫ-subnormalized
classical quantum channel such that V ′ ≤ V . For any random variable M over
M independent of the uniform seed S, it holds
χ(M ;S, V ◦ f−1S ) ≤
1
ln 2
max
m∈M
λ2(f,m) rank[V
′(X )]max
x∈X
‖V ′(x)‖∞+
+ ǫ+ ǫ log
|X |
dS
.
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Proof. Joining Lemmas 5.3 and 5.5 to 5.7, we obtain directly,
χ(M ;S, V ◦ f−1S ) ≤ log
(
1 + max
m∈M
λ2(f,m) rank[V
′(X )]max
x∈X
‖V ′(x)‖∞
)
+
+ ǫ+ ǫ log
|X |
dS
.
The result follows simply from log(1 + x) ≤ x/ ln 2.
In the next section we will finally define what a code using BRI functions
looks like. The chain of lemmas above will allow us to prove that we can achieve
capacity with such codes. There, the classical-quantum channels of the lemmas
above will be the classical-quantum channel generated by a transmission code
around the actual wiretap channel. So the V above should not be confused with
the actual wiretap, but instead it will be the composition of the wiretap V ⊗n
and the encoder. This is why all the lemmas above are single letter.
5.2 BRI modular codes
We can now prove the final statements. As will be noticed in the next proof, BRI
functions are not used to upgrade the strong secrecy achieved by, e.g., a hash
function or any strong-secrecy capacity-achieving code. Instead, the BRI func-
tions replace hash functions and directly produce a semantic-secrecy capacity-
achieving code out of a capacity-achieving error-correction code.
Let us now fix an actual wiretap channel. We fix a finite space X , two finite
quantum systems H and H ′, and a classical-quantum wiretap channel (W,V )
defined as the classical-quantum channels W : X → S(H) and V : X → S(H ′).
For reference, recall that an (n, |S|, |M|) common-randomness code is a finite
subset {Cs = {(Esm, Dsm) : m ∈ M} : s ∈ S} of the set of (n, |M|) codes, labeled
by a finite set S, the common randomness. We then define BRI modular codes
as follows.
Definition 5.11. Let S, and M be the finite sets for the space of the seeds,
the messages and the encodings. Let {xnc , Dc}c∈C be an (n, |C|) code for W , and
let f : S × C → M be a BRI function. We define their BRI modular code
to be the common-randomness code such that for every seed s ∈ S and message
m ∈M
1. the encoder Esm is the uniform distribution over
{
xnc : c ∈ f−1s (m)
}
,
2. the decoder is Dsm =
∑
c∈f−1s (m)
Dc.
Notice that, in practice, for the decoder it will be more straightforward to simply
decode c and then compute directly fs(c), instead of implementing the coarse
grained decoding operators.
Theorem 5.12. For any probability distribution P over X :
1. there exist BRI modular codes achieving the semantic secrecy rate χ(P ;W )−
χ(P ;V ) using codes achieving the transmission rate χ(P ;W );
2. the same rate is achievable with their derandomized codes.
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Notice that this theorem implies that the classical-quantum wiretap channel
capacity can also be achieved with such modular codes, and thus in particular
the second point of the theorem also provides an alternative proof for Theo-
rem 4.1 with BRI scheme. Indeed, since the theorem holds for all P , we can
also directly achieve the supremum. This single letter formula then implies the
multi-letter formula by standard argument. More precisely, we can write the
classical-quantum wiretap capacity as
Cw(W,V ) = sup
n∈N
1
n
max
E
C1w(EW
⊗n, EV ⊗n), (49)
where
C1w(W,V ) := max
P
(χ(P ;W )− χ(P ;V )). (50)
Then the standard argument, which we reproduce in Lemma 5.13 for complete-
ness, shows that if C1w is achievable by a class of codes, it automatically follows
that Cw is also achievable.
Proof. Fix the arbitrary distribution P , fix any ǫ > 0, and let δ be a positive
number which will later be chosen as a function of ǫ. By [32, 42, 43], there exists
a γ > 0 such that for sufficiently large n, there exists an (n, |X ′|) transmission
code {E′x′ , D′x′ : x′ ∈ X ′} for W whose rate is at least χ(P ;W ) − ǫ/2, whose
maximal error probability is at most 2−nγ , and whose codewords moreover are
all δ-typical, namely the encoders satisfy E(T nP,δ|x′) = 1 for all messages x′ ∈ X ′.
(For the definition of T nP,δ, see Appendix A. For an explicit proof that the error
can be made to decrease exponentially, see, e.g., [30, Lemma 4.1]).
We have to find a suitable BRI function in order to ensure semantic security.
By enlarging n if necessary, we have enough flexibility to choose integers k and
d satisfying
n
(
χ(P ;V ) +
ǫ
4
)
≤ log d ≤ n
(
χ(P ;V ) +
ǫ
2
)
,
n
(
χ(P ;W )− ǫ
2
)
≤ k + log d ≤ log |X ′|.
As previously mentioned, we can choose BRI functions f : S×S →M from [48],
satisfying |S| = 2kd, |M| = 2k and
λ2(f,m) ≤ 4
d
≤ 4 · 2−n(χ(P ;V )+ ǫ4 ). (51)
We think of S as a subset of X ′ and define {Cs := {Esm, Dsm : m ∈M} : s ∈ S}
to be the BRI modular code constructed from C′ := {E′s, D′s : s ∈ S} and f . Its
rate clearly satisfies
log |M|
n
=
k
n
≥ χ(P ;W )− χ(P ;V )− ǫ
and the maximal error probability is no larger than that of the transmission
code, i.e., it is upper-bounded by 2−nγ . In order to evaluate the security of the
BRI modular code, we define the classical-quantum channel U = E′V ⊗n and
upper-bound
χ(M ;S,ESV ⊗n) = χ(M ;S,U ◦ f−1S ),
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for any random variable M on M independent of the uniform seed S.
We introduce a subnormalized classical-quantum channel V ′ : T nP,δ → L(Hn)
by defining
V ′(xn) = ΠnPV,δΠ
n
V,δ(x
n) · V ⊗n(xn) ·ΠnV,δ(xn)ΠnPV,δ. (52)
For the definition ofΠnPV,δ andΠ
n
V,δ(x
n), see Appendix A. By Lemma A.1, V ′ is a
2−nη(δ) subnormalized classical-quantum channel satisfying V ′(xn) ≤ V ⊗n(xn)
for all xn ∈ T nP,δ. Since all codewords are contained in T nP,δ,
U ′ := E′V ′
is a 2−nη(δ) subnormalized classical-quantum channel satisfying U ′ ≤ U , and
Corollary 5.10 and Equation (51) imply
χ(M ;S,ESV ⊗n) ≤ 4
d ln 2
rank[U ′(X ′)] max
x′∈X ′
‖U ′(x′)‖∞ + 2−nη(δ)(k + 1). (53)
Since the inputs are chosen from a set of typical sequence T nP,δ, Lemma A.1 can
be used to find
rank[U ′(X ′)] max
x′∈X ′
‖U ′(x′)‖∞ ≤ rank[V ′(Xn)] max
xn∈TP,δ
‖V ′(xn)‖∞
≤ 2n(χ(P,V )+γ′′(δ)).
Inserting this and Equation (51) into Equation (53) gives
χ(M ;S,ESV ⊗n) ≤ 4
ln 2
2−n(ǫ/4−γ
′′(δ)) + (k + 1)2−nη(δ). (54)
Since k is n times the rate of our common-randomness code, thus by Theorem 4.1
it cannot grow faster than nCw(W,V ), and thus
χ(M ;S,ESV ⊗n) ≤ 4
ln 2
2−n(ǫ/4−γ
′′(δ)) + (nCw(W,V ) + ǫ
′ + 1)2−nγ . (55)
Now choose δ small enough for γ′′(δ) < ǫ/4 to hold. Then this upper bound
tends to zero at exponential speed with n. Hence as the blocklength n increases,
our BRI modular code {Cs : s ∈ S} achieves the rate χ(P ;W ) − χ(P ;V ) with
exponentially decreasing error probability and leakage.
As previously mentioned, the codes we constructed use common randomness.
This allows us to simply provide the seed needed by the BRI modular code
and keep the proof focused on the properties of the BRI function. We now
derandomize these codes. Notice, however, that this is a standard procedure,
and does not really depend on the structure of the BRI modular codes, but
simply in the scaling of its size and errors.
We derandomize, as per Definition 3.8, the BRI modular code above. We set
n′ = n and share the seed with the same transmission code C′ used to construct
the BRI modular code. For the number of reuses of the seed we need to choose
a sequence (N(n))n∈N such that 1 ≪ N(n) ≪ 2nγ , N(n) ≪ 2n(ǫ/4−γ′′(δ)),
and N(n) ≪ (nCw(W,V ) + ǫ′ + 1)−12nγ . For simplicity it suffices to choose
N(n) = n− 1 and thus we define C¯ as the n− 1-derandomized code constructed
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from C′ and {Cs : s ∈ S}. The total number of channel uses is then n2. By
Equation (55) and Lemma 3.9 we have
log |Mn−1|
n2
=
n− 1
n
k
n
≥
(
1− 1
n
)
(χ(P ;W )− χ(P ;V )− ǫ)
e(C¯, n(N(n) + 1)) ≤ 2−nγn
χ(M ; E¯V ⊗n
2
) ≤ 4n
ln 2
2−n(ǫ/4−γ
′′(δ)) + n(nCw(W,V ) + ǫ
′ + 1)2−nγ .
The same argument as for the BRI modular code now works. Since δ was chosen
to satisfy γ′′(δ) < ǫ/4, this upper bound still tends to zero with n, and our
derandomized BRI modular code achieves the rate χ(P ;W )− χ(P ;V ).
The following is the standard statement that any single letter achievable rate
implies a multi-letter achievable rate. We give a proof for completeness.
Lemma 5.13. If C1(W,V ) is an achievable rate, then
C∞(W,V ) := sup
n∈N
1
n
max
E
C1(EW⊗n, EV ⊗n), (56)
where the maximum is over finite sets A and stochastic mappings E : A → Xn,
is also an achievable rate.
Proof. In order to show that Csem(W,V ) is also achievable given that C
1(W,V )
is achievable, we pick any n and E. We obtain a new classical-quantum wiretap
channel (EW⊗n, EV ⊗n) for which we know that the rate C1(EW⊗n, EV ⊗n) is
achievable. Specifically, for any ε > 0 and sufficiently large n′, there exists an
(n′, C1(EW⊗n, EV ⊗n)−ǫ, ǫ) code {E′m, D′m : m ∈M} for (EW⊗n, EV ⊗n). The
error and leakage only depend directly on the encoder and channels compositions
E(EW⊗n)⊗n
′
and E(EV ⊗n)⊗n
′
, thus they do not change, and thus the code
{E′mEn
′
, D′m : m ∈ M} is a (nn′, (C1(EW⊗n, EV ⊗n)−ǫ)/n, ǫ) code for (W,V ).
Therefore C1(EW⊗n, EV ⊗n)/n is achievable for (W,V ). Since the above holds
for all n and E, taking the supremum concludes the proof.
In this section we showed that there exist modular coding schemes con-
structed from suitable transmission codes and BRI functions which achieve the
security capacity of the classical-quantum wiretap channel and provide semantic
security. Compared to the results of Section 4, the message sets of these mod-
ular codes are given explicitly via the BRI function. In particular, they do not
depend on the wiretap channel.
6 Further Perspectives
In classical information, not only discrete channels, but also continuous channels
are important subjects of study. In [48] semantic security was demonstrated for
both discrete channels and continuous channels. Thus it will be very interesting
to analyze if we can extend these results to continuous quantum channels. As
mentioned above, the results of [48] show how a non-secure code can be trans-
formed into a semantic secure code. Thus it will be a promising next step to
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analyze if these results can be extend to non-secure code for continuous quan-
tum channels, e.g., classical-quantum Gaussian channels, which are continuous-
variable classical-quantum channels undergoing a Gaussian-distributed thermal
noise [34]. Furthermore, similar to the discrete channels, one can consider that
the eavesdropper will have access to the environment’s final state [41] for con-
tinuous quantum channels as well. Thus it will be an interesting further step
to analyze if the results of Section 3.4 can be extended to continuous quan-
tum channels. Further discussions will be the extension of these techniques on
more complicated networks, e.g., arbitrarily varying wiretap channels. This is
currently also still open for classical networks.
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A Technical Lemmas
We now bound the V dependent term of Lemma 5.7. Before stating the ac-
tual lemma, we need to recall some facts about typical sequences and typical
operators, as can be found, e.g., in [49].
Let X be a finite set. Let P be a probability function on X . Let δ > 0
and n ∈ N. The set T nP,δ of typical sequences of P consists of those xn ∈ Xn
satisfying
•
∣∣∣∣ 1nN(a | xn)− P (x′)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ|X | for all a ∈ X ,
• N(a|xn) = 0 if P (a) = 0 for all a in X ,
where N(a | xn) is the number of occurrences of the symbol a ∈ X in the
sequence xn.
Let H be a finite-dimensional complex Hilbert space. Let ρ ∈ S(H) be
a state with spectral decomposition ρ =
∑
x P (x) |x〉〈x|. For any other basis of
eigenvectors the same statements will be valid. The δ-typical subspace is defined
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as the subspace spanned by
{
|xn〉 : xn ∈ T nP,δ
}
, where |xn〉 := ⊗ni=1 |xi〉. The
orthogonal projector onto the δ-typical subspace is
Πnρ,δ =
∑
xn∈T n
P,δ
|xn〉〈xn| .
and satisfies the following properties. There are positive constants α(δ), β(δ),
and γ(δ), depending on δ such that for large enough n
tr
(
ρ⊗nΠnρ,δ
)
> 1− 2−nα(δ) , (57)
2n(S(ρ)−β(δ)) ≤ tr(Πnρ,δ) ≤ 2n(S(ρ)+β(δ)) , (58)
2−n(S(ρ)+γ(δ))Πnρ,δ ≤ Πnρ,δ · ρ⊗n ·Πnρ,δ ≤ 2−n(S(ρ)−γ(δ))Πnρ,δ . (59)
Similarly let X be a finite set, and H be a finite-dimensional complex Hilbert
space. Let V : X → S(H) be a classical-quantum channel. For a ∈ X suppose
V (a) has the spectral decomposition V (a) =
∑
j V (j|a)|j〉〈j| for a stochastic
matrix V (·|·). The α-conditional typical subspace of V for a typical sequence
an is the subspace spanned by
{⊗
a∈X |jIa〉 , jIa ∈ T IaV (·|a),δ
}
. Here Ia := {i ∈
{1, · · · , n} : ai = a} is an indicator set that selects the indices i in the sequence
an = (a1, · · · , an) for which the i-th symbol ai is equal to a ∈ X . The subspace
is often referred to as the α-conditional typical subspace of the state V ⊗n(an).
The orthogonal subspace projector which projects onto it is defined as
ΠnV,α(a
n) =
⊗
a∈X
∑
jIa∈T Ia
V (·|an),α
|jIa〉〈jIa | .
For an ∈ T nP,α there are positive constants β(α)′, γ(α)′, and δ(α)′, depending
on α such that
tr
(
V ⊗n(xn)ΠnV,δ(x
n)
)
> 1− 2−nα′(δ) , (60)
2n(S(V |P )−β
′(δ)) ≤ tr (ΠnV,δ(xn)) ≤ 2n(S(V |P )+β′(δ)) , (61)
2−n(S(V |P )+γ
′(δ))ΠnV,δ(x
n) ≤ ΠnV,δ(xn)V ⊗n(xn)ΠnV,δ(xn)
≤ 2−n(S(V |P )−γ′(δ))ΠnV,δ(xn) .
(62)
For the classical-quantum channel V : X → S(H) and a probability distribu-
tion P on X we define a quantum state PV := ∑a P (a)V (a) on S(H). Clearly,
one can then speak of the orthogonal subspace projector ΠPV,δ fulfilling Equa-
tions (57) to (59). For ΠPV,δ there is a positive constant α(δ)
′′ such that for
every xn ∈ T nP,δ, the following inequality holds:
tr
(
V ⊗n(xn) ·ΠnPV,δ
) ≥ 1− 2−nα′′(δ) . (63)
Lemma A.1. Let V : X → S(H) be a classical-quantum channel. For any
δ > 0 and probability distribution P over X , define the subnormalized classical-
quantum channel V ′ : T nP,δ → L(Hn) by
V ′(xn) := ΠnPV,δΠ
n
V,δ(x
n) · V ⊗n(xn) · ΠnV,δ(xn)ΠnPV,δ. (64)
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We assume that the inputs are chosen from a set of typical sequence T nP,δ with
a probability distribution P and a positive δ. Then V ′ ≤ V ⊗n. Moreover, there
exist positive η(δ) and γ′′(δ) such that if n is sufficiently large, V ′ is a 2−nη(δ)-
subnormalized classical-quantum channel and
rank[V ′(Xn)] max
xn∈T n
P,δ
‖V ′(xn)‖∞ ≤ 2nχ(P ;V )+nγ′′(δ). (65)
Proof. It is obvious that V ′ ≤ V ⊗n. To check that the trace of V ′ is close to 1,
let xn ∈ T nP,δ and define
V ′′(xn) = ΠnV,δ(x
n)V ⊗nΠnV,δ(x
n).
Clearly
tr(V ′(xn)) = tr(V ′′(xn))− tr((I −ΠnPV,δ)V ′′(xn)).
By Equation (60), tr(V ′′(xn)) ≥ 1 − 2−nα′(δ). Also, it is clear that V ⊗n(xn)
commutes with ΠnV,δ(x
n) and that V ′′(xn) ≤ V ⊗n(xn). Therefore
tr
(
(I −ΠnPV,δ)V ′′(xn)
) ≤ tr((I −ΠnPV,δ)V ⊗n(xn))
≤ 2−nα′′(δ).
Altogether, if we set
η(δ) = min{α′(δ), α′′(δ)},
we obtain that
tr(V ′(xn)) ≥ 1− 2−nη(δ),
so V ′ is a 2−nη(δ)-subnormalized version of V ⊗n.
Now we bound maxxn∈T n
P,δ
‖V ′(xn)‖∞. By Equation (62), for any xn ∈ T nP,δ
we have
V ′(xn) ≤ ΠnV,δ(xn) · V ⊗n(xn) · ΠnV,δ(xn) (66)
≤ 2−n(S(V |P )−γ′(δ))ΠnV,δ(xn) , (67)
thus implying that
max
xn∈T n
P,δ
‖V ′(xn)‖∞ ≤ 2−n(S(V |P )−γ
′(δ)). (68)
We finally bound the rank[V ′(Xn)]. By Equation (58) we have
rank[V ′(Xn)] ≤ rank[ΠnPV,δ] = trΠnPV,δ ≤ 2n(S(PV )+β(δ)) . (69)
We combine Equations (68) and (69) and obtain
rank[V ′(X )] max
xn∈Tn
P,δ
‖V ′(xn)‖∞ ≤ 2n(χ(P ;V )+β(δ)+γ
′(δ)) . (70)
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